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Can Referendums Foster Citizen Deliberation? The Experience of Canada and the 
United Kingdom  
Ailsa Henderson and Stephen Tierney 
I Introduction 
Despite their recent proliferation, referendums, addressed in the longue durée, are something 
of a rarity in both Canada and United Kingdom. At the national level only three have been 
held in the UK (in 1975, 2011 and 2016: Table 1), while in Canada the referendum on the 
1992 draft Charlottetown Accord is the only recent example (Table 2). Referendums are in 
fact more common at the provincial/sub-state level where the issue of secession has been 
bound up with direct democracy in each country. There have also been referendums on 
electoral reform at the sub-state level in Canada and on AV at national level in the UK.  This 
chapter compares the ‘sovereignty’ referendums held in Quebec, particularly that in 1995, 
with the Scottish ‘independence’ referendum of 2014. 
Reviewing the processes of each of these referendums, we address the issue of citizen 
deliberation in theory and practice. The theoretical problem posed is how to integrate 
participation and deliberation within referendum processes. Referendums tend to carry a 
negative connotation within political and constitutional theory. The charge is that they are 
open to manipulation by political elites and are therefore not capable of facilitating the 
meaningful deliberation of citizens. Far from being an asset to democratic decision-making, 
referendums are seen as a risk to an otherwise healthy constitutional system (Haskell 
2001).The democratic deficiencies associated with referendums are in large part issues of 
practice rather than principle and these can be surmounted by way of carefully-tailored 
regulation of the referendum process (Tierney 2012). To this end the recent turn in political 
theory and democratic practice towards deliberative democracy is an aid to process 
construction; it offers insights as to how theory and practice can come together to inform 
rule-making through which a referendum can be shaped to help engage citizens, and thereby 
produce a meaningful act of republican deliberation (Tierney 2009). 
In Part II we will lay out the theoretical framework, before turning to an empirical account of 
the practice of Quebec and Scottish referendums. This will begin with a discussion of how 
the referendums in each country were designed, assessing which elements of each served 
either to promote or frustrate effective citizen deliberation before the referendum, as well as 
satisfaction with the process afterwards.  
Part III will address a second empirical dimension. It is one thing to design a process which, 
prima facie, appears to offer the opportunity for good deliberation, it is quite another for this 
to take place within the actual lived experience of the referendum campaign. It is here that we 
turn to political science with which we can test how effective this design was in terms of 
nurturing citizen satisfaction with democracy.  
Losers’ consent may in the end be unattainable; this is politics after all, and politics is about 
conflict (Crick). But losers’ assent may be achievable: a preparedness by losers to agree to if 
not with the result of a referendum. We will explore what evidence exists in relation to each 
of our case studies. 
II Designing the Referendum Process  
Can referendums be deliberative? Referendums may seem to represent an ideal model of 
participatory democracy. The voters are engaged directly in constitutional decision-making, 
speaking together as one unified people, with the power to determine the issue at stake. What, 
within the classical ideal of popular government, could be more democratic? In this vignette 
the republican promise of democracy is seemingly fulfilled; political equality, expressed in a 
way unmediated by politicians, gives effect to a collective expression of popular sovereignty 
(Bogdanor 1981, 93). But for others the referendum is in fact a threat to democracy. This can 
only be safeguarded by way of professional politicians, whose decision-making is both 
informed by expertise and carefully structured by way of constitutional design to prevent the 
triumph of populism and transient majorities; the task of democratic constitutionalism is to 
construct institutions which will contain and balance the popular will, rather than give effect 
to it in an unqualified way.  
There are three main objections that inform scepticism of direct democracy: that referendums 
lend themselves, by definition, to elite control and hence to manipulation by the organisers of 
the referendum (‘the elite control syndrome’); that there is an inherent a tendency of the 
referendum process merely to aggregate pre-formed opinions rather than to facilitate 
meaningful deliberation (‘the deliberation deficit’); and that referendums consolidate and 
indeed promote simple majoritarian decision-making at the expense of minority and 
individual interests (‘the majoritarian danger’) (Tierney 2012). 
In this paper we address each of these criticisms. The elite control syndrome is the most 
common criticism of referendums. The charge is that that referendums promise popular 
power, including control by the people over elites, but are themselves so open to 
manipulation by elites as to belie that promise. In other words, even if popular influence on 
constitutional processes is a republican good, referendums fail to deliver by that marker. 
Supporting this critique is the presupposition that the executive is able to shape the 
referendum process in a way that suits its objectives. Among the tools that are frequently 
assumed to be at the disposal of elites are: the initial decision to stage the referendum, the 
power unilaterally to frame the question, and the capacity to determine the process rules by 
which the referendum will be conducted, rules which can then be shaped to play to the 
government’s strengths, for example by manipulating funding and spending regulations or 
rules about thresholds for support. According to this criticism, the government is in effect 
able to produce its desired result. As the Arend Lijphart (1984, 203) famously put it, ‘most 
referendums are both controlled and pro-hegemonic’ (see also Qvortrup 2000).  
The second objection flows from the first. It asserts that public reasoning is absent from 
referendum processes. Representative government is an infinitely preferable model of 
decision-making because it is designed in a way that causes elected politicians to cooperate 
with each other, allowing them only to arrive at decisions having offered convincing reasons 
for their views. By contrast, such informed reflection upon, and discussion of, the issues at 
stake are neither required nor facilitated in referendum processes, and are accordingly absent.  
What we find undergirding these critiques, however, are a number of assumptions which are 
themselves often based upon stereotypes: referendums are often held quickly, based upon a 
short-term political calculation made by government; voters are faced with an issue which 
they have not had time to learn about or debate; voter confusion can be exacerbated by a 
deliberately obscure question which in many cases pushes responses in a particular direction; 
and citizens with busy lives lack the time and incentive to engage with the issue and even the 
ability to understand it. The overall picture is one in which turnout is often low, and those 
who do vote often do so without much information and with little reflection, deliberation or 
public discussion, largely following the cues set by those who have staged the referendum. 
Despite the force of these criticisms it does seem that referendums are often held to a very 
different standard from that used to assess the democratic efficacy of representative 
democracy, which can also be a crude device for promoting a plurality of interests. (Tierney 
2012, 40-41). But the point we will focus upon is that these concerns with referendums can in 
large part be overcome by way of good process design, (Tierney 2012, 285-303) which if 
well-constructed can help promote a range of positive outcomes. 
Referendums can also be evaluated in terms of the ways that citizens judge the process, and 
in particular the way that they engage those who are on the losing side.  To function well, 
democratic systems must engender among participants positive attitudes to the democratic 
regime.  This reserve of goodwill among citizens is characterised by feelings of trust, 
efficacy, satisfaction or confidence and is integral to the perceived legitimacy of the political 
system. We know that the presence or absence of such goodwill varies by state and can be 
affected by the structure of political system or the extent to which participation is facilitated.  
We know too that within political systems reserves of goodwill vary across the population.  
The challenge of any democratic system is to generate these reserves of goodwill not just 
within the electorate as a whole but among those who back losing options in democratic 
contests.  Within elections, there are certain factors that can help to generate losers’ consent. 
These include measures of proportional representation so that governments reflect the wishes 
of the electorate as a whole, regular elections (giving losers another chance to influence 
government formation) as well as governments activing in the interests of all not just their 
own supporters (Anderson et a 2005, Anderson and Guillory 1997, Anderson and Lo Tempio 
2002, Blais and Gélineau 2007, Henderson 2008, Esaiasson 2011). 
Referendums, by their very nature, pose challenges to losers’ consent. The issues on which 
referendums are held can be polity shaping (Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart 2004) and 
emotive, where the stakes are seen to be higher, the results more permanent than for 
elections. They are more often to be binary and potentially more divisive than elections, 
particularly in multi-party systems.  Not all referendums are similar. Some are on well-known 
issues, where the electorate has clearly formed opinions. Others are on newer issues where 
attitudes are more malleable.  The range of referendums offers different contexts in which 
voters can engage, learn about and evaluate options and have differing levels of attitudinal 
volatility (Leduc 2002).  We would therefore expect referendums on binary issues to pose 
more challenges for losers’ consent, just as referendums on older, more emotive issues to 
pose more challenges than those on less salient issues.  In such a contest, attitudes to the 
referendum process can exert a decisive role (Henderson 2012).  This sets the context for an 
evaluation of referendums in Quebec and Scotland, in particular the 1995 referendum on 
sovereignty partnership and the 2014 referendum on independence.  Both, arguably, offered 
referendums in which losers’ consent was likely to be difficult to generate but with sufficient 
variation in process that we can determine what impact this had on satisfaction. 
III Evaluating the 1995 and 2014 referendums 
Who controls the process? 
Canada, unlike the United Kingdom, lacks a national referendum law capable of forming the 
basis of an agreed process for referendums across the country. The United Kingdom, by 
contrast, has the highly detailed Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 
(PPERA), which sets out detailed rules on question-setting, funding and spending etc. and 
which also created an independent regulatory body, the Electoral Commission, to oversee 
referendum (and other electoral) processes.  
One example of how much less fraught this made the Scottish than the Quebec process is 
over question-setting. This was a significant issue in both Canadian referendums. Both 
sovereignty referendums were run by the Directeur generale des elections du Québec (DGE-
Q).    While the DGE-Q has authority to regulate spending, the framing of the question was 
solely a matter for the provincial government.  The questions asked in both 1980 and 1995 
were  arguably convoluted. It is not unreasonable to think that they would have encouraged 
people to believe they were voting for an outcome, association1 or partnership2 with Canada, 
that would fall short of independent statehood.  The questions were long, referring to other 
pieces of legislation, and sought to identify what sovereignty means.  The 1980 question 
referred to the prospect of another referendum following negotiations.  The 1995 question 
implied that sovereignty partnership, if not achieved, would result in independence.  
Although advocates of change argued that a Yes vote was clearly a vote for more power, in 
1995 in particular it was not clear whether Yes voters expected sovereignty partnership or 
independence to be the likely result were they to win the referendum.  By contrast, in the 
Scottish referendum, the referendum was preceded by an agreement between both levels of 
government on the referendum process, buttressed by PPERA, which allows for independent 
oversight of referendum questions. Key too was the decision of the Scottish Government, to 
ask a short, clear question which would allow it to focus on the substantive content of the 
independence proposal. 
In relation to the question itself, the Edinburgh Agreement provided:  
‘Both governments agree that the referendum question must be fair, easy to 
understand and capable of producing a result that is accepted and commands 
confidence.’3  
One duty of the Electoral Commission under PPERA is to assess and comment upon the 
‘intelligibility’ of proposed referendum questions.4 Notably the Electoral Commission goes 
about this task by convening focus groups etc. to test the question empirically, assessing how 
well it is understood by people etc.5 The initial question proposed by the Scottish 
                                                          
1 The question posed in 1980 was: 
"The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of 
Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive 
power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad — in other words, sovereignty — 
and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; 
any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will only be implemented with popular 
approval through another referendum; on these terms, do you give the Government of Quebec the 
mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?" 
2 The question posed in 1995 was:  
"Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a 
new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and 
of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?".  
The reference to two external documents was arguably confusing for voters. 
3 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, para 5. 
4 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c.41, s.104(2). 
5 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on the UK Parliamentary Voting System: Report of views of the Electoral 
Commission on the proposed referendum question’, (The Electoral Commission, 2010), 
Government was: ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country? Yes/No’. 
The Electoral Commission took the view that  
‘based on our research and taking into account what we heard from people and 
organisations who submitted their views on the question, we consider that the 
proposed question is not neutral because the phrase ‘Do you agree …?’ could lead 
people towards voting ‘yes’.’  
It therefore recommended the following alternative question: ‘Should Scotland be an 
independent country? Yes/No’.’6 This was accepted by the Scottish Government and this was 
the question included in the Scottish Independence Referendum Act,7 and ultimately put to 
the voters. 
The contrast with the two Quebec referendums is clear. The Edinburgh Agreement allowed 
for UK involvement in the referendum process, as well as oversight by a mutually acceptable 
independent national regulator who would have a role in reviewing the wording of the 
question. Notably the Scottish Government in 2012 suggested the establishment of a Scottish 
Referendum Commission to regulate the process, but this was dropped as part of the 
Edinburgh Agreement. In Quebec there was no involvement for the Canadian government in 
the process, nor did the DGE-Q have a role in regulating the question.  It oversaw the fairness 
of the process more broadly, but not the question itself.   
Deliberation Deficit 
In Scotland therefore we saw that elite control was dispersed: both the UK and Scottish 
governments were party to the Edinburgh Agreement and beyond this the process was subject 
to law and independent oversight. But it is one thing for elite control to be constrained, it is 
another to facilitate deliberation. Here again the Scottish process demonstrates prima facie 
strengths. For example, PPERA again set the benchmark for strict and fair funding and 
spending rules, regulation of advertising etc. which helped to create a level playing field. 
These were given specific guarantees in the Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013.  
In Quebec there were also efforts to ensure that voters were provided with balanced in 
formation. In 1980, for example, the DGE distributed a pamphlet with arguments for the Yes 
and No campaigns.  The DGE also had responsibility for regulating spending.  Following the 
1995 referendum in particular it investigated several complaints about the practices of 
organisations such as Via Rail and post-secondary institutions for funding travel of Canadians 
outside Quebec to attend the Montreal unity rally shortly before the referendum. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/102696/PVSC-Bill-QA-Report.pdf; 
Electoral Commission, Referendum on independence for Scotland: Advice of the Electoral Commission on the 
proposed referendum question, (The Electoral Commission, 2013) 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/153691/Referendum-on-independence-for-
Scotland-our-advice-on-referendum-question.pdf 
6 ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland: Advice of the Electoral Commission on the proposed referendum 
question’, (The Electoral Commission, 2013) 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/153691/Referendum-on-independence-for-
Scotland-our-advice-on-referendum-question.pdf. 
7 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, s.1(2). See also, ‘Scottish independence: SNP accepts call to 
change referendum question’, BBC News, 30 January 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-
politics-21245701 
However, another advantage of the Edinburgh Agreement process is that it also served to 
legitimise the referendum outcome. In the Scottish process the quid pro quo to the Scottish 
Government’s acceptance of this regulatory model was a concession that the UK Government 
would accept the result of the referendum. The Agreement ended with this paragraph on 
cooperation: 
‘The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments are committed, through the 
Memorandum of Understanding between them and others, to working together on 
matters of mutual interest and to the principles of good communication and mutual 
respect. The two governments have reached this agreement in that spirit. They look 
forward to a referendum that is legal and fair producing a decisive and respected 
outcome. The two governments are committed to continue to work together 
constructively in the light of the outcome, whatever it is, in the best interests of the 
people of Scotland and of the rest of the United Kingdom.’8 
This stage was never reached in Canada in either 1980 or in 1995, a point made clear by the 
circumstances surrounding the Secession Reference brought to the Supreme Court of Canada 
by the Canadian government, the very premise of which was the federal government’s refusal 
to countenance Quebec’s right to secede.  
And of course, the difference in legal regimes did not exempt either from criticisms by 
different actors or organisations.  In Scotland, the BBC was perceived by some Yes voters to 
be biased towards the Better Together campaign.  The late intervention of the party leaders of 
the three largest UK political parties, committing to some form of unspecified institutional 
change in the event of a No vote, was also seen as confusing to voters.  In Quebec, the DGE 
investigated not only funding irregularities, particularly around the unity rally, but also 
instances of voter fraud and the high proportion of rejected ballots in a limited number of 
constitutions. 
In the end the independence referendum in Scotland passed off smoothly with no disputes 
over any of the key process issues, including the funding and spending rules which were also 
established by the Edinburgh Agreement.9 This is particularly telling given the change to the 
franchise rules, extending the right to vote in the referendum for 16 and 17 year olds.  The 
upshot was that both sides in the referendum campaign, and therefore citizens themselves, 
were able to focus upon the substantive issues at stake without being distracted by whether or 
not the referendum was lawful or whether the UK Government would accept the result of a 
majority Yes vote. This was fundamentally important to the process and a key condition 
which allowed the Scottish process to be seen as a genuine moment of citizen deliberation. 
The Scottish referendum also enjoyed high participation levels. The turnout of 84.65% was 
the highest for any UK electoral event since the introduction of universal suffrage, and 
compares very well to the 65.1% who voted in the 2010 UK general election and the 50.6% 
who turned out for the 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections. Another feature of the 
referendum was that the Scottish Parliament extended the franchise to those aged 16 and 17.10 
                                                          
8 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, para 30. 
9 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, paras 24-28. 
10 Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013, s.2(1)(a). 
This was a radical departure; never before have people under the age of 18 been entitled to 
vote in a major British election or referendum.11 This makes the turnout even more 
remarkable when we consider the significant logistical task involved in registering new voters 
and in mobilising so many young people to engage with an electoral campaign for the first 
time.12 
But turnout is only part of the picture. Evidence has emerged of the extent to which people 
sought out information about the issue at stake and engaged vociferously with one another at 
home, in the workplace and other public spaces, and, to an unprecedented degree in British 
politics, on social media.13  
This leads us to a discussion of referendum features designed to facilitate losers’ consent. 
Majoritarian Danger 
Interestingly, the issue of the size of majority required to validate a referendum vote for 
independence was never a topic of dispute in Scotland in 2014, the way it was in Quebec, 
particularly in 1995. The fact that it was not even mentioned in the Edinburgh Agreement 
illustrates the implicit acceptance that 50% plus one of those voting would decide the 
referendum. This had been the requirement in 1997 for devolution, although the 1979 
devolution referendum had required a threshold of 40% of the electorate to secure success. 
To a Canadian audience it may well seem odd that the UK Government agreed to a process 
which could have, in effect, broken up the country by way of one simple majority vote. This 
was of course a concern for the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference, where 
one of the constitutional principles to which it referred was ‘respect for minority rights’.14 
And in the Reference the court made clear that the interests of minorities would be very 
important to the constitutional permissibility of any secession process.15 It also announced 
that the validity of any future referendum on secession would depend upon a ‘clear majority’, 
a term upon which it did not elaborate. 
The contrast with the UK does not appear to be mainly one of constitutional principle, but 
rather a consequence of very different demographics. Quebec is a francophone province but 
                                                          
11 Representation of the People Act 1983, c.2, s.1(d). 
12 Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013, s.9. Although the extension of the vote to younger 
voters can be seen as a strategic move by the SNP Government to enfranchise those who might prove to be 
independence supporters, it should also be noted that such a move has long been SNP policy and that the 
referendum was the first opportunity the SNP government had to make such a change. It now has the power to 
change the franchise for the 2016 Scottish parliamentary elections and is indeed seeking to extend the vote to 
young people for this process: Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Bill, Scottish Parliament, 2 April 
2015. It is also the case that the UK Government accepted the former franchise extension in the Edinburgh 
Agreement and has since then extended the Scottish Parliament the power to introduce a general extension for 
Scottish Parliament elections:  Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedules 4 and 5 and Transfer of Functions 
to the Scottish Ministers etc.) Order 2015.   
13 https://www.aqmen.ac.uk/project/socialmedia; and Ailsa Henderson, Liam Delaney and Robert Liñeira, ‘Risk 
and Attitudes to Constitutional Change’, ESRC Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change Risk and 
Constitutional Attitudes Survey, 16 August 2014. 
14 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, para 49. 
15 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, paras 77, 88, 81 and 90-93. 
one that is home to a long-established Anglophone minority and many indigenous peoples. It 
is in defending the interests of these people that the Secession Reference seems primarily to 
be concerned, rather than the more general minority of voters who might find themselves on 
the losing side. Scotland, by contrast, does not have territorial minorities in the same sense.  
That said, there is also a divergence on the point of constitutional principle as to whether or 
not fundamental constitutional decisions should be made by way of simple majority. This is 
less of an issue in the UK where Parliament can change the constitution by way of ordinary 
legislation. But it is no surprise that a ‘supermajority’ argument emerged in relation to the 
Quebec referendum in a country where qualified majority (and in some cases unanimous) 
provincial consent is needed for constitutional change.  
To conclude, it is clear that elite control was constrained in Scotland and that the 
organisational context in general was propitious for fostering of healthy deliberation. 
Furthermore, the process was also not over-shadowed about arguments concerning the 
appropriate threshold for the result. But what evidence is there for actual voter engagement in 
both the Scottish and Quebec referendums? 
IV Citizen Evaluations of the 1995 and 2014 Referendum Process 
We can gauge the level of voter engagement with referendum arguments by examining levels 
of knowledge.  Obviously, examining the extent to which voters were aware of the outcomes 
of independence or a No vote takes us into the realm of risk perception rather than 
knowledge.  In other instances, we can evaluate knowledge of what the various Yes 
campaigns were advocating.  Here we can see evaluations are variable across policy areas. 
We see also different trends across votes in Scotland and Quebec. In Quebec, No voters 
tended to perceive fewer links between an independent Quebec and Canada than Yes voters.  
In Scotland, the reverse is true for some questions. 
 
Table 1: Knowledge and perception, Quebec 1995 and Scotland 2014, % agreeing 
   
 Yes No 
Sovereign Quebec will send MPs to Ottawa 25 20 
Independent Scotland would send MPs to Westminster 29 39 
 
Sovereign Quebec will be protected by Canadian army 55 31 
Independent Scotland would be protected by the UK army 20 30 
 
Canadian government will not block Quebec access to NAFTA 79 50 
Scotland would be able to retain membership of the EU on the same 
terms as the UK 
 
63 8 
Sovereign Quebec will use Canadian dollar 85 45 
The UK government would allow Scotland to keep the pound 70 15 
 
The questions are not always equivalent. The 1995 Yes campaign advocated a sovereign 
Quebec using the Canadian dollar, just as the 2014 Yes campaign advocated using the pound 
sterling.  The question asks for knowledge of a campaign policy in Quebec, but asks about its 
likelihood in the case of Scotland. In both cases we see the greatest divergence between Yes 
and No voters on issues of currency and wider continental arrangements (NAFTA in the case 
of Quebec, EU membership in the case of Scotland). 
Another method by which we can evaluate a referendum is by the presence of losers’ consent 
(or assent). In general, voters were satisfied with the process, or rather some voters were.  
Results from the Scottish Referendum Study, conducted before and after the 2014 
referendum, as well as the Quebec Referendum Study, conducted after the 1995 vote, show a 
majority of referendum winners were satisfied with the way democracy was working. They 
show also that winners were more likely to be satisfied than losers. 
Table 2: Post-Referendum satisfaction with democracy in Quebec 1995 and Scotland 2014, 
% 
 Quebec Scotland 
Winners 60.7 63.0 
Losers 46.3 15.2 
 
Table 2 reports the percentage of winners and losers satisfied with the way democracy is 
working. A clear majority of winners are satisfied and a minority of losers are satisfied.  
While much of the evidence suggests that the regulation and conduct of the referendum in 
Scotland offered an example of best practice, losers were significantly less satisfied with the 
way democracy was working than they were in Quebec.  There are three caveats to this.  
First, the post-referendum satisfaction should be viewed in light of pre-referendum 
satisfaction.  As the Quebec survey was only conducted after the referendum we have no way 
to evaluate the post-referendum satisfaction against a pre-referendum benchmark. In 
Scotland, however, we do.  Here we find that ‘only’ 19.2% of eventual referendum losers (i.e. 
Yes voters) were satisfied with the way democracy was working.  Second, in Scotland we 
have data from one year after the referendum to examine whether this sheds light on losers’ 
consent.  Here we find that satisfaction with UK democracy among losers had decreased to 
14.1% but had also decreased among winners to 55.4%.  Third, the satisfaction with 
democracy question is the standard indicator to gauge losers’ consent, but the question itself 
can be tied to referendum preferences.  One might reasonably expect someone advocating 
independence for Scotland to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the United 
Kingdom.  The September 2015 figure could well be tapping dissatisfaction with the 2015 
UK general election result.  The gap is narrower (and overall levels are higher) when we ask 
about satisfaction with democracy in Scotland.  Indeed here we find the opposite of what we 
would expect, evidence of a possible issue with winners consent rather than losers’ consent. 
Table 3: Pre and post-referendum satisfaction with democracy in Scotland 
 Yes voters No voters 
Pre-referendum 71.6 56.8 
Post-referendum (Sept 2014) 63.6 62.5 
Post-referendum (Sept 2015) 70.7 43.0 
 
Despite the degree of popular participation in the Scottish process, it is still notable that while 
citizens played a full role in the referendum campaign itself and voted in high numbers, their 
role prior to this was largely passive. The decision to hold a referendum was taken by the 
Scottish Government, while the Edinburgh Agreement determined that the referendum could 
be held only on the issue of independence and not on any other model of constitutional 
change.   
This raises a serious democratic concern about the overall process. In the course of 2012 it 
became clear that a substantial majority of citizens in Scotland were in favour of 
constitutional change, but not of full independence. The Scottish Government tapped into this 
sentiment and revived an earlier suggestion of a third option on the ballot – some formulation 
of further devolution.16 The United Kingdom government reacted strongly to this. Its key 
political goal in consenting to the Edinburgh Agreement was to ensure that the referendum 
would contain only two options – independence and the status quo – since it was confident 
that it could defeat the independence proposal. To that end the Agreement, while enabling the 
Scottish Parliament to legislate for a referendum, made clear that it could do so only ‘with 
one question on independence’.17 While the Edinburgh Agreement was a positive step in 
avoiding hostility between the two campaigns over the process, it was also an elite deal which 
constrained the options which were presented to voters. In short, it was a trade-off between 
the political goals of the SNP on the one hand – to acquire the legal authority to manage the 
process rules - and, on the other hand, a political calculation made by the UK government 
that it could win a referendum on independence but would probably lose a referendum which 
promised more – and potentially open-ended - powers to the Scottish Parliament.  
V Conclusion 
What was missing from the Scottish referendum design process, therefore, was a step which 
would ensure that citizens were in fact able to vote for the most popular constitutional option. 
This is not to single out the Scottish referendum as particularly deficient. The typical story of 
referendums is one in which elites are able to set the agenda. The process rules, the length of 
a campaign, and the question that is set are typically in the hands of the executive, albeit 
subject to parliamentary approval; constitutionally guaranteed opportunities for citizens or 
other deliberative bodies to influence the process are invariably lacking.  
The Scottish referendum is in general an instance of good referendum design in which the 
process rules were agreed by both sides allowing the debate to focus upon issues of 
substance. This contrasts with the two Quebec referendums where so much of the debate was 
side-tracked by procedural matters. However, it is also clear that a good setting for popular 
deliberation is not in itself enough to bring that about. Much depends upon the appetite of the 
electorate to gain knowledge of the issues, whether the issues with which they are presented 
seem important to them and whether the political system and civil society are sufficiently 
healthy to help impart information in an objective way. A broader assessment may be that 
while a contested process can deeply damage the democratic engagement of citizens and their 
faith in the system as the Quebec experience shows, agreed formal processes are of 
themselves insufficient to engender deep citizen engagement. 
 
Appendix 
Referendums in the United Kingdom 
                                                          
16 Scotland’s Future: Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper, 2010. 
17 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, para 6. 
Place Date Issue Result 
Northern 
Ireland 
8 March 1973 Remain part of the UK  
 
Approved: 98.9 
Northern 
Ireland 
22 May 1998 Belfast Agreement Approved: 71.1 
Scotland 1 March 1979 Creation of a Scottish 
Assembly  
Approved: 52 
(did not meet 
threshold) 
Wales 1 March 1979 Creation of a Welsh 
Assembly 
Not approved: 
79.7 
Scotland 11 September 
1997 
1. Creation of a Scottish 
Parliament. 
2. Devolution of limited 
tax-varying powers 
1. Approved: 74.3 
2. Approved: 63.5 
Scotland 18 September 
2015  
Independence Not Approved: 
55.3 
Wales 18 September 
1997 
Creation of a National 
Assembly 
Approved: 50.3 
England 
(London) 
7 May 1998 GLA and Mayor  Approved: 72 
England 
(North East) 
4 November 
2004 
North East England 
regional assembly 
Not approved: 78 
Wales 3 March 2011 Devolution of further 
powers to the National 
Assembly 
Approved: 63.5 
Scotland 18 September 
2014 
Independence Not approved: 
55.3 
United 
Kingdom 
5 June 1975 Continued EC 
membership 
Approved: 67.2 
United 
Kingdom 
5 May 2011 Electoral System: 
Alternative Vote 
Not approved: 
67.9 
Table 1 
Referendums in Canada 
Place Date Issue Result 
Canada 29 September 
1898 
Prohibition of alcohol Approved: 51.2 
Canada 27 April 1942 Conscription Approved: 64.5 
Canada 26 October 1992 Constitutional renewal 
(Charlottetown Accord) 
Not approved: 
54.3  
Quebec April 10 1919 Legalization of sale of 
alcohol 
Approved: 78.62 
Quebec 20 May 1980 Sovereignty Association Not approved: 
59.6 
Quebec 30 October 1995 Sovereignty and 
Partnership 
Not approved: 
50.6  
Ontario 
 
23 October 1924 Continuation of 
prohibition statute 
Limited sale of alcohol 
Approved: 51.5 
 
Not approved: 
51.5 
Ontario 10 October 2007 Electoral Reform Not approved: 63 
Newfoundland 3 June 1948 Constitutional Status Inconclusive: 
44.6% for 
restoration of 
dominion status, 
41.1% for 
confederation 
with Canada, 
14.3% for 
continuing the 
Commission of 
Government 
Newfoundland 22 July 1948 Confederation Approved: 52.3 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
 5 September 
1995 
Non-Denominational 
School System 
Approved: 54.4 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
2 September 
1997 
Non-Denominational 
Schools 
Approved: 73 
New 
Brunswick 
14 May 2001 Retain Video Lottery 
Terminals 
Approved: 53.1 
Nova Scotia  October 16 2004 Allow Sunday shopping Not approved: 
54.9 
British 
Columbia  
August 30, 1972 Time settings Not Approved: 
63.4 
British 
Columbia 
October 17, 1991 Recall of elected 
officials 
Introduction of Initiative 
Referendum 
Recall approved 
80.9 
Initiative 
approved 83 
British 
Columbia 
(postal 
referendum) 
15 May 2002 First Nations Treaty 
Rights 
Over 80% 
approval on the 
eight principles 
asked about 
British 
Columbia 
17 May 2005 Electoral Reform Not approved: 
support of 57% of 
voters but failed 
to meet 
‘supermajority’ 
threshold of 60% 
British 
Columbia 
12 May 2009 Electoral Reform Not approved: 
60.9% 
British 
Columbia 
13 June – 5 
August 2011 
(postal 
referendum) 
Sales Tax 
discontinuation 
Approved: 55 
Prince Edward 
Island 
January 18, 1988 Confederation Bridge Approved: 59.4 in 
favour of the 
fixed link 
Prince Edward 
Island 
28 November 
2005 
Electoral Reform Not approved: 64   
Northwest 
Territories 
April 14, 1982 division plebiscite Approved: 56.48 
% 
Northwest 
Territories 
4 May 1992 Jurisdictional boundaries  Approved: 54 
Alberta  August 17, 1948 Electrification plebiscite 
The ballot offered two 
options on electricity 
regulation, asking if the 
province should create a 
Crown corporation to 
manage electricity, or 
leave the electricity 
industry in the hands of 
the companies currently 
Option A: 
Approved 50.03% 
Option B: Not 
approved 49.97% 
in the business. 
Alberta  
 
May 23, 1967 Daylight Saving Time 
plebiscite 
Not approved: 
51.25 
Alberta  August 30, 1971  Daylight Saving Time Approved:  61.5 
Nunavut  11 December 
1995 
Nunavut capital  Approved: 60 
Nunavut 26 May 1997 Equal representation  Not approved: 
57.4  
Table 218 
 
  
                                                          
18 There have been many provincial referendums since 1892 on the prohibition of alcohol. For reasons of space 
we have not listed these, but see Donovan, 132-135. 
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